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I.

INTRODUCTION

W

ar crimes are historically conceptualized as falling within two main categories: those concerned with the conduct of hostilities (including breaches
of the rules governing the means and methods of warfare) and those concerned with custodial abuses against protected persons. The latter are commonly assumed to be easier to prosecute because the abuse is unjustifiable
and often incontestable and legal actors are not required to contend with the
proverbial fog of war or to gain access to battlefield evidence. 1 Nor do such
charges require finders of fact to calculate whether any incidental harm to
civilians was excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, as demanded by the intertwined principles of distinction
and proportionality. 2 Indeed, the norm of humane treatment for persons deprived of their liberty is fundamental to international humanitarian law
(IHL)—and human rights law for that matter—and brooks no derogation. 3
Nonetheless, all war crimes are challenging to prosecute for a range of
reasons, including the technicality of some constitutive elements, the difficulties of amassing sufficient evidence to meet applicable burdens of proof,
the vagaries of unreliable or unavailable witnesses, and the often-impenetrable khaki wall of silence. Adding to these ubiquitous challenges, the United
States has erected a number of idiosyncratic structural barriers in the way in
which it has incorporated the prohibitions against war crimes into its domestic legal frameworks, both military and civilian. The shortfalls in the former
are comprehensively discussed in an important recent paper by Geoff Corn

1. Stephen Wilkinson, The Challenges of Establishing the Facts in Relation to “Hague Law”
Violations, in WAR CRIMES AND THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES: CHALLENGES TO ADJUDICATION AND INVESTIGATION 313 (Fausto Pocar et al. eds., 2013).
2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 51(5)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3; See generally Paola Gaeta, Serious Violations of the Law on the Conduct of Hostilities: A
Neglected Class of War Crimes, in WAR CRIMES AND THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES: CHALLENGES TO ADJUDICATION AND INVESTIGATION 20 (Fausto Pocar et al. eds., 2013).
3. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article
4), ¶ 13(a), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2l/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) (“All persons deprived of their
liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person. Although this right . . . is not separately mentioned in the list of non-derogable rights
in article 4, paragraph 2, the Committee believes that here the Covenant expresses a norm
of general international law not subject to derogation.”).
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and Rachel VanLandingham. 4 Here, I will address problems with our federal
war crimes statute as it appears in Title 18, the U.S. penal code. 5 My concerns
encompass the formulation of the in personam jurisdictional provisions, the
way the statute has been interpreted by the Department of Justice and other
authoritative sources, and a number of substantive complications and shortfalls. Together, these deficiencies have rendered the War Crimes Act a dead
letter since its enactment in 1996.
My recommendations for reform are directed at both Congress and the
Executive Branch who should, within their respective spheres of competency, work to: (1) better conform the War Crimes Act to U.S. obligations
under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and enable the United States to prosecute war crimes committed anywhere in the world regardless of the nationality of the victim or perpetrator, (2) withdraw and repudiate controversial
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memoranda advancing a crabbed interpretation of the concept of “protected persons” when it comes to individuals in
the custody of a High Contracting Party (HCP) to the Conventions, (3) restructure the statute to obviate the need to undertake a complicated conflict
classification exercise, (4) enact a superior responsibility statute that would
apply to war crimes and other international crimes within U.S. jurisdiction,
and (5) re-penalize the war crime of “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment,” which is prohibited by Common Article 3 but was decriminalized upon the passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
Addressing these problems through legislative fixes, new legal interpretations, and policy pronouncements would bring the United States into better compliance with its treaty obligations and the rules adopted and applied
by its NATO and other allies. It would likewise enable the United States to
prosecute a wider range of war crimes committed in all armed conflicts,
whether international or non-international, and regardless of the nationality
of the accused or victim. In so doing, it would be in a position to contribute
to evolving jurisprudence under the law of armed conflict, which is otherwise
4. Geoff S. Corn & Rachel VanLandingham, Strengthening War Crimes Accountability, 70
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 309 (2020). Because there is concurrent jurisdiction
in federal courts over crimes committed by U.S. service personnel, some of these proposals
will impact military justice as well.
5. War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/04/16/act-pl104-192.pdf. The statute was
first codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2401(b), later renumbered as 18 U.S.C. § 2441 by § 605(p)(1) of
the Economic Espionage Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-294 (1996).
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being shaped by international and foreign courts. In this regard, it would
signal U.S. intolerance for deliberate harm to individuals who find themselves in the custody of a State to which they are not nationals and ensure
that superiors do not escape legal censure when they know, or should know,
that their subordinates are committing, or have committed, abuses and they
fail to take the necessary steps to prevent and punish these breaches. Finally,
having a more coherent war crimes regime will bolster the United States’
complementarity arguments vis-à-vis international and foreign courts that
might seek to assert jurisdiction over U.S. personnel.
This article addresses these concerns in three parts. To lay a foundation
for the analysis of the U.S. War Crimes Act, it sketches the way in which war
crimes find expression in IHL, including in treaties to which the United
States is a party and customary international law. It then provides a quick
legislative history of the War Crimes Act of 1996 with reference to evolving
positions advanced by various executive branch agencies and the statute’s
advantages and shortfalls. It closes with a set of discrete drafting and policy
recommendations to address the latter, focused on expanding the jurisdictional reach of the legislation, strengthening the United States’ implementation of the Conventions’ “protected persons” regime, obviating the need to
engage in conflict classification, enabling the prosecution of superiors whose
subordinates commit war crimes, and prosecuting a wider range of war
crimes, including one that has proven particularly useful to European prosecutors.
II.

WAR CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

As long as humankind has waged war, there have been rules in place governing acceptable behavior in armed conflict, giving lie to Cicero’s claim that
silent enim lēgēs inter arma—in war, the law falls silent. 6 Although the history of
the law of war is often told from the perspective of international conferences
held in The Hague and Geneva, all human cultures have endeavored to regulate this seemingly inherent aspect of our shared humanity. Recorded history confirms that the ancient Israelites, Greeks, and Romans, for example,
distinguished between combatants and civilians and made only the former
6. Marcus Tullius Cicero, Pro T. Annio Milone Oratio, in 14 CICERO ORATIONS: PRO
MILONE––IN PISONEM––PRO SCAURO––PRO FONTEIO––PRO RABIRIO POSTUMO––PRO
MARCELLO––PRO LIGARIO––PRO REGE DEIOTARIO 16–17 (N.H. Watts trans., Harvard
Univ. Press 6th prtg. 1979) (n.d.).
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the lawful object of attack. 7 Certain Islamic traditions dictated that captured
combatants and civilians should be humanely treated. 8 Likewise, in ancient
combat, particular weapons or tactics were prohibited if they caused excessive damage. 9 In 1139, for example, the Second Lateran Council condemned
the use of the crossbow against fellow Christians (specifically excepting
those deemed to be “infidels”), foreshadowing subsequent efforts to ban the
use of weapons viewed as unnecessarily cruel or inhumane. 10
One of the first comprehensive codifications of the laws of armed conflict is found in the Lieber Code, drafted during the American Civil War by
Professor Francis Lieber of Columbia College, approved by President Abraham Lincoln, and promulgated by the Secretary of War to govern the Union
forces. 11 Though only applicable to this specific conflict, the Code provided
inspiration for other States to issue similar regulations and ultimately for the
first multilateral treaties on the laws of war, including the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Many of the
provisions in the Lieber Code, along with antecedent rules tracing back to
the earliest era of recorded history, are now contained in a web of bilateral
and multilateral treaties, making IHL one of the most codified areas of international law. 12 A rich body of customary international law—painstakingly
documented by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—
supplements this extensive treaty regime. 13
7. See generally 1 ALEXANDER GILLESPIE, A HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF WAR (2011);
LAWRENCE H. KEELEY, WAR BEFORE CIVILIZATION: THE MYTH OF THE PEACEFUL SAVAGE (1996).
8. AHMED AL-DAWOODY, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF WAR: JUSTIFICATIONS AND REGULATIONS 138 (2011).
9. 3 ALEXANDER GILLESPIE, A HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF WAR 53–56 (2011).
10. Arnold Blumberg, The Medieval Crossbow: Redefining War in the Middle Ages, WARFARE
HISTORY NETWORK, https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2021/04/18/the-medievalcrossbow-redefining-war-in-the-middle-ages/; See also Second Lateran Council–1139 A.D., PAPAL ENCYCLICALS ONLINE, https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum10.htm (last
visited Nov. 4, 2021).
11. U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, https://www.loc.gov/
rr/frd/Military_Law/Lieber_Collection/pdf/Instructions-gov-armies.pdf.
12. See Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Treaties, State Parties and Commentary Database,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
13. See Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Customary IHL Database, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home (last visited Nov. 4, 2021). But see John B.
Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the International Committee
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The codification of IHL historically evolved along two parallel tracks.
The first, originating from a series of international conferences in The Hague
and elsewhere, concerns the means and methods of warfare and seeks to
limit the tactics of war and prohibit the use of weapons designed to cause
superfluous injury (“Hague Law”). 14 One of the most important treaties to
emerge from this effort was undoubtedly the 1907 Convention Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which contains a detailed set of
regulations in its annex. 15 The fundamental principle of the jus in bello is found
in Article 22, which states that “[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of
injuring the enemy is not unlimited.” The regulations go on to forbid the
deployment of poisoned weapons; the killing or wounding of those belligerents who are hors de combat (i.e., those who have laid down their weapons and
no longer present a threat); means of warfare “calculated to cause unnecessary suffering”; the destruction or seizure of enemy property unless “imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”; and attacks on undefended
towns or buildings. 16
The second track, originating from a series of treaties sponsored by the
ICRC in Geneva, establishes protections for individuals uniquely impacted
by or vulnerable in war, especially those who do not—or who no longer—
participate directly in hostilities: the wounded and the sick in the field (Geneva Convention I), the wounded and sick at sea (Geneva Convention II),
prisoners of war who are subject to detention but entitled to combatant immunity (Geneva Convention III), and civilians and other actors in the battlespace not covered by one of the previous instruments (Geneva Convention IV). 17 Each treaty contains a precise definition of the persons protected.
of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 443 (2007) (raising concerns about the ICRC’s methodology for
identifying customary rules, particularly when it comes to identifying state practice).
14. See Manley O. Hudson, Present Status of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, 25 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 114 (1931).
15. Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Fourth Hague Convention].
16. Id. art. 23.
17. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GCIII]; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter GCIV].
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GCIV, for example, applies to: “those who at a given moment and in any
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in
the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are
not nationals.” 18 GCIV in particular reflects the fact that prior law-of-war
treaties, such as the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, were concerned
only with the treatment of detained combatants and had, in the words of
the ICRC’s commentary, proven “insufficient in view of . . . the problems
relating to the protection of civilians in enemy territory and in occupied territories.” 19
The four Geneva Conventions primarily govern international armed
conflicts (IACs), in the sense of conflicts between nation-States, and oblige
their parties to criminalize so-called “grave breaches” of the treaties when
they are committed against protected persons in these circumstances. Grave
breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention encompass wilful killing; torture
or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; wilfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health; unlawful deportation or
transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person; compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power; wilfully depriving a
protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial; the taking of hostages;
and extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly. 20 The treaties oblige
HCPs to impose universal jurisdiction over breaches by codifying these prohibitions; “search[ing] for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches”; and bringing “such persons,

18. GCIV, supra note 17, art. 4. The article goes on to identify certain exceptions, such
as nationals of neutral or co-belligerent States so long as normal diplomatic relations are in
place. Id.
19. Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Treaties, State Parties and Commentaries, Convention (IV)
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/380 (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
20. GCIV, supra note 17, art. 147. The breach of other treaty rules does not necessarily
give rise to individual criminal responsibility per the treaty text. See id. art. 146 (“Each High
Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to
the provisions of the present Convention other than . . . grave breaches.”).
1547
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regardless of their nationality, before its own courts” or, in the alternative,
to extradite them to another signatory for trial (aut dedere aut judicare). 21
The goal of such a forceful prosecutorial regime was to address a problem that was top of mind following World War II: war criminals avoiding
prosecution by finding sanctuary in neutral countries. 22 When it comes to
this “enforcement trifecta” of inter-related responsibilities, 23 States retain a
margin of appreciation in implementation and are entitled to enact “a more
extended criminalization of violations of the law of armed conflict under
national legislation.” 24 Many States, including the United States, have thus
criminalized other IHL violations beyond the grave breaches committed in
inter-State wars identified by the Geneva Conventions. 25

21. Id. art. 146 (“It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its
own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.”). The original
commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions elaborates:
The obligation on the High Contracting Parties to search for persons accused to have committed grave breaches imposes an active duty on them. As soon as a Contracting Party
realizes that there is on its territory a person who has committed such a breach, its duty is
to ensure that the person concerned is arrested and prosecuted with all speed. The necessary
police action should be taken spontaneously, therefore, not merely in pursuance of a request
from another State.

COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 593 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958).
22. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE
DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97–99 (1995); Rudiger
Wolfrum & Dieter Fleck, Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law, in THE HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 675 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing

the Convention’s universal jurisdiction regime). For the history of these provisions, see Int’l
Comm. Red Cross, Article 129: Penal Sanctions, COMMENTARY OF 2020, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=F
B2C21E0040F0217C125858400446E95 (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
23. Corn & VanLandingham, supra note 4, at 320.
24. Fausto Pocar, The Criminalization of the Violations of International Humanitarian Law from
Nuremberg to the Rome Statute, in WAR CRIMES AND THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES: CHALLENGES TO ADJUDICATION AND INVESTIGATION 1, 1 (Fausto Pocar et al. eds., 2013).
25. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF LEGISLATION AROUND THE WORLD—2012 UPDATE (Oct. 9, 2012); American University, War Crimes Research Office, Universal Jurisdiction Project, https://www.wcl.american.edu/impact/initiatives-programs/warcrimes/our-projects/universal-jurisdiction-project/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2021) (tracking ability of States to prosecute war crimes under
universal jurisdiction in IACs and NIACs).
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Virtually all of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply only to
IACs absent the conclusion of a special agreement extending the Conventions’ provisions to other types of conflicts. 26 Only Common Article 3 (so
named because it finds expression in all four Geneva Conventions) applies
to armed conflicts “not of an international character,” today designated as
non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). 27 A “convention in miniature,”
Common Article 3 contains a set of non-derogable prohibitions, but no express penal regime. 28
The international community adopted two Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions in 1977 in response to the changing nature of armed conflict
and the post-colonial geopolitical balance of power, which saw the nature of
armed conflicts shift to predominantly NIACs, the movement of the battlefield to population centers, increased civilian involvement in hostilities, an
expanding U.N. General Assembly seized of certain oppressive political situations (such as apartheid South Africa), and the expansion of guerilla warfare. Protocol I defines international conflicts as including “armed conflicts
in which people are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination,” relaxes the requirements for privileged combatant status (i.e., those
bearing arms who are entitled to combatant immunity), provides a detailed
set of rules concerning the obligation to discriminate between military and

26. GCIV, supra note 17, art. 2 (noting that parties to a conflict that have not ratified
the treaty may be bound by it if they accept and apply its provisions). For example, the
parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia entered into a number of agreements “without any prejudice to the legal status of the parties to the conflict or to the international law
of armed conflict in force” setting forth the rules governing the conduct of hostilities. See
Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Former Yugoslavia, Special Agreement Between The Parties to the Conflicts,
ICRC: HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/formeryugoslavia-special-agreements-between-parties-conflicts (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
27. GCIV, supra note 17, art. 3.
28. Common Article 3 applies to persons taking no active part in hostilities and those
hors de combat. It prohibits violence to life and person (including murder, mutilation, cruel
treatment, and torture), the taking of hostages, outrages upon personal dignity (in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment), and the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording judicial guarantees. See David A. Elder, The Historical Background of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, 11 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
37 (1979).
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civilian targets, and further defines and clarifies the rules with respect to mercenaries. 29 Marking a convergence of Hague and Geneva Law, and articulating the first treaty-based war crimes associated with the conduct of hostilities, Protocol I also expands the category of grave breaches. Additional
crimes to be prosecuted by HCPs pursuant to universal jurisdiction include
making civilians or cultural property the object of attack, launching indiscriminate attacks, and forcibly transferring parts of the civilian population in
or out of occupied territory. 30
For its part, Protocol II elaborates on the minimum rules in Common
Article 3, but raises the threshold of applicability to govern only those NIACs that meet certain additional conditions. 31 It sets out rules of conduct
addressed to the means and methods of warfare that echo, albeit faintly,
those that regulate IACs. While Protocol I identifies additional “grave
breaches” that should be made subject to prosecution under principles of
universal jurisdiction, Protocol II imposes no new penal obligations on
HCPs. A proposal to include a universal jurisdiction provision within Protocol II was “explicitly rejected by the majority of the States attending the revision conference in Geneva” as an “unacceptable intrusion on State sovereignty.” 32
When it comes to individual criminal responsibility, many more treaty
rules govern IACs as compared to NIACs, including rules focused on detention operations. However, over the years, the customary international jus puniendi governing NIACs has developed in a way that mirrors, in most respects, the rules governing IACs. As such, the legal distinctions among war
crimes punishable within international versus non-international armed conflicts have diminished considerably, and the various tracks of IHL have converged to create a more complete corpus of law that applies across the conflict spectrum. 33 Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
29. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3.
30. Id. arts. 11, 85. Other breaches of the treaty, however, are not designated as “grave
breaches” subject to the penal regime. See, e.g., id. arts. 35, 54.
31. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609.
32. Pocar, supra note 24, at 12.
33. See Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Customary IHL Database, supra note 13, r. 156; DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 506 (1956) (noting

1550

Animating the U.S. War Crimes Act

Vol. 97

Court—and recent amendments thereto 34—reflects this gradual merging of
Hague and Geneva Law and of the law applicable in international and noninternational armed conflicts. 35 Besides the Rome Statute, many additional
developments contributed to this advancement, including the jurisprudential
innovations of the modern war crimes tribunals, the incorporation of the
Rome Statute’s war crimes provisions into domestic penal codes around the
world, and local courts adjudicating war crimes cases. 36
III.

THE U.S. WAR CRIMES ACT

The United States ratified the four Geneva Conventions in 1955. 37 Although
it signed both 1977 Protocols (and ratified another establishing a third protected symbol 38), it has not ratified either of them. 39 In 1986, President
Ronald Reagan recommended that the Senate ratify Protocol II, subject to
certain reservations, understandings, and declarations, but not Protocol I, 40
in part due to disagreements with the latter’s expansion both of the category
of IAC to include certain wars of national liberation and of the concept of
that the terms of the treaties are “declarative of the obligations of belligerents under customary international law to take measures for the punishment of war crimes committed by
all persons, including members of a belligerent’s own armed forces”).
34. See Amal Alamuddin & Philippa Webb, Expanding Jurisdiction Over War Crimes Under
Article 8 of the ICC Statute, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1219 (2010).
35. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
36. See YORAM DINSTEIN, NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 205, 211–19 (2014).
37. Ratification was delayed in part due to controversy stemming from the Korean War
about whether Article 118 of GCIII required the forcible repatriation of prisoners of war
or if the treaty allowed signatories to offer asylum to detainees who faced political persecution at home. See Jan P. Charmatz & Harold M. Wit, Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the
1949 Geneva Convention, 62 YALE LAW JOURNAL 391 (1953).
38. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, Dec. 8, 2005, 2404 U.N.T.S. 261 (establishing the red crystal as a protected symbol not associated with a religious tradition).
The other two symbols used to designate protected areas are the red cross and the red crescent.
39. See U.S. Department of Defense, Office of General Counsel, Official Treaty Documents Related to the Law of War, https://ogc.osd.mil/Law-of-War/Treaty-Documents/
(last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
40. See Ronald Reagan, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting
the Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 (Dec. 13, 1986),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/protocol-II-100-2.pdf.
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“combatant” to include individual fighters who may not fully distinguish
themselves from noncombatants at all times. 41 Successive administrations
have continued to support ratification of Protocol II, with President Bill
Clinton formally renewing the request for advice and consent, but the Senate
never acted on the recommendation and both Protocols remain unratified. 42
On the theory that existing U.S. law provided adequate means of prosecuting war crimes under state, federal, and military law (namely the newly
enacted Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)), 43 and because the Geneva Conventions got tied up in controversy around the Bricker Amendment, 44 no implementing legislation was immediately enacted following ratification. However, in the mid-1990s, attention returned to the Conventions,
and it was acknowledged that there were in fact circumstances in which ex-

41. See COL. THEODORE T. RICHARD, UNOFFICIAL UNITED STATES GUIDE TO THE
FIRST ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949
(2019). The United States has indicated, however, that certain provisions of Protocol I constitute or reflect customary international law. See White House, Fact Sheet: New Actions on
Guantánamo and Detainee Policy (Mar. 7, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-sheet-new-actions-guant-namo-and-detainee-policy (noting that the United States will “choose out of a sense of legal obligation to
treat the principles set forth in Article 75 as applicable to any individual it detains in an
international armed conflict, and expects all other nations to adhere to these principles as
well”). This position was first articulated by Michael J. Matheson, as the State Department
Deputy Legal Adviser. See Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 419 (1987).
42. See William J. Clinton, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict and, for Accession, the Hague Protocol (Jan. 6, 1999), https://www.loc.gov/
rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC-message-from-pres-1999.pdf (“I also wish to take this opportunity to reiterate my support for the prompt approval of Protocol II Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 . . . [which was] transmitted to the Senate for advice
and consent to ratification in 1987 by President Reagan but has not been acted upon.”).
43. See Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
For. Rel., 82d Cong. 23–29, 58–59 (1955); War Crimes Act of 1996, H.R. Rep. No. 104–698,
at 3–4 (1996). The UCMJ was passed in 1950. See 18 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
44. This proposed Constitutional amendment would have limited the treaty power. See
Donald Richberg, The Bricker Amendment and the Treaty Power, 39 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 753
(1953).
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tant law was insufficient to prosecute certain grave breaches committed outside the United States as required by the treaties, 45 particularly given emerging jurisprudence limiting the reach of U.S. courts-martial. 46 The effort was
inspired, in part, by the recognition that the United States had no mechanism
by which to prosecute war crimes committed against U.S. servicemembers
during the Vietnam war. 47 Congress thus began the process of drafting a War
Crimes Act in order to “carry out the international obligations of the United
States under the Geneva Conventions to provide criminal penalties for certain war crimes” by allowing for the prosecution of grave breaches of the
treaties. 48
The first attempt at a bill was exclusively focused on grave breaches of
the four Conventions, or of any Protocol that the United States might subsequently ratify, committed against U.S. military personnel or citizens. 49 In
congressional testimony about the proposed legislation, a number of U.S.
government agency representatives urged Congress to expand the statute
along two dimensions: the statute’s jurisdictional reach, to encompass all
U.S. perpetrators as well as persons found in the United States, and the list
of punishable acts, to penalize additional war crimes, including those committed within NIACs. The next iteration of the bill, which ultimately passed
in 1996, took up the personal jurisdiction proposals in part but did not adopt
other proposed expansions. 50 The War Crimes Act as originally enacted thus
granted jurisdiction only over crimes denominated as grave breaches by the

45. H.R. Rep. No. 104–698, supra note 43, at 5.
46. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (identifying constitutional protections
owed to civilians who may be tried under military law).
47. Congressman Walter B. Jones Jr., himself a Vietnam veteran, was instrumental in
this regard. See W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Prosecuting Torture: Walter Jones and the Unintended Consequences of the War Crimes Act of 1996, PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORY (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/march2019/prosecuting-torture-walter-jones-and-the-unintended-consequences-of-the-warcrimes-act-of-1996.
48. See War Crimes Act of 1996, H.R. 3680, 104th Cong. (1996). See generally Department of Justice, War Crimes Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-192), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/
war-crimes-act-1996-pl-104-192 (compiling legislative history).
49. War Crimes Act of 1995, Hearing on H.R. 2587 before the H. Committee on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1996).
50. H.R. 3680, supra note 48.
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treaties and committed by, or against, U.S. nationals (as defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act 51) or members of the U.S. armed forces. 52
When it comes to the statute’s personal jurisdictional provisions, this
clear departure from the dictates of the 1949 Geneva Conventions was controversial and the product of interagency discord. When Congress was debating the War Crimes Act, both the Departments of Defense (DoD) and
State argued in a series of congressional hearings and written statements that
the United States should allow for the prosecution of any suspected war
criminal present in the United States in order to comply with the 1949 Geneva Conventions. For example, in response to the original bill, then-DoD
General Counsel Judith Miller advocated that
the jurisdictional provisions should be broadened from the current focus
on the nationality of the victims of the war crime. Specifically, we suggest
adding two additional jurisdictional bases: (1) where the perpetrator of a
war crime is a United States national (including a member of the Armed
Forces); and (2) where the perpetrator is found in the United States, without regard to the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim. 53

Miller indicated that the first change would allow for the prosecution of former U.S. service members in federal court since they would no longer be
eligible for prosecution by court-martial under prevailing Supreme Court
precedent. 54 The second change, she argued, “is required in order to be in
compliance with our international obligations.” 55 She also suggested that the
list of war crimes be expanded to include violations of certain rules contained
in the Annex to Hague Convention IV and Common Article 3. Echoing
these recommendations, John H. McNeill, Senior Deputy General Counsel
of the Department of Defense, confirmed that “the law should apply to any
51. The term “national of the United States” means citizens of the United States and
any person “who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to
the United States.” See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22).
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(b). Certain aliens residing outside of the United States—mostly
hailing from the three island nations in free association with the United States—are allowed
to enlist in the U.S. armed forces. See Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Immigrant Veterans in the
United States, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (May 16, 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrant-veterans-united-states-2018.
53. H.R. Rep. No. 104-698, supra note 43, at 13.
54. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (holding Congress
cannot subject ex-service members to trial by court-martial).
55. H.R. Rep. No. 104-698, supra note 43, at 13.
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person who has committed a war crime and is subject to the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts.” 56
Michael J. Matheson, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department
of State, also testified in support of these proposed expansions to the bill. 57
In particular, he argued that the United States “has an interest in punishing
any U.S. national or armed service member who commits” war crimes as
well as suspected war criminals of any nationality who would seek safe haven
in the United States. 58 When it came to prosecutable war crimes, Matheson
raised the specter of Rwanda and urged the inclusion of a broader list of war
crimes drawn from Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, noting
that “some of the most horrible war crimes occur in internal armed conflicts.” 59 To this, he also suggested the addition of violations of the Annex
to the 1907 Hague Convention, concerning the means and methods of warfare, and of a newly amended protocol to the Convention on Conventional
Weapons limiting the use of certain weapons 60 that was on the eve of being
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. 61 In support of expanding
the list of prosecutable crimes, he invoked steadfast U.S. support for the
work of the newly established International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), which was just beginning to exercise jurisdiction over
such crimes as a function of its constitutive statute and customary international law.
As an additional argument in favor of these amendments, Matheson observed that the U.S. government’s leverage in calling on other countries to
comply with IHL was limited because of the gaps in the United States’ own
56. Id. at 14.
57. Hearing on H.R. 2587, supra note 49, at 9–10.
58. See War Crimes Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 2587 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 8 (June 12, 1996)
(testimony of Michael J. Matheson, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser), https://20092017.state.gov/s/l/65717.htm (hereinafter Matheson, House of Representatives Testimony). See also Hearing on H.R. 2587, supra note 49, at 9 (noting that this would “follow a
pattern adopted in the U.S. Criminal Code for offenses implicating other international obligations, such as piracy, attacks on internationally-protected persons, and attacks against
international civil aviation”).
59. Matheson, House of Representatives Testimony, supra note 58.
60. See Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and
Other Devices as amended on May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93.
61. Matheson further argued that the “United States should take care now, in H.R.
2687, to provide for making such offenses criminal under U.S. law when the amended Protocol comes into force for the United States.” Matheson, House of Representatives Testimony, supra note 58.
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enforcement regime, “particularly with respect to persons who commit such
crimes outside the United States but who enter U.S. territory.” 62 In this regard, he considered a robust war crimes statute to be a “diplomatic tool.”
Said Matheson:
Expanding U.S. criminal jurisdiction over war crimes will serve not only
the purpose of ensuring that the United States is able to comply fully with
its obligations under international law, but will also serve as a diplomatic
tool in urging other countries to do the same. Currently the U.S. Government’s leverage in calling on other governments to enforce the laws of
armed conflict is restricted because of the limitations [in] our own domestic
enforcement jurisdiction. . . . With this bill, if modified as we suggest, we
will set the right example and use it to persuade other governments to abide
by and enforce the laws of armed conflict. 63

When asked about reciprocity concerns (the risk of rogue nations
launching politicized charges against U.S. persons), Matheson averred that
this risk existed independent of U.S. actions and that such nations would not
be influenced by the content of U.S. laws. 64 Still, Matheson acknowledged
that “it would not necessarily be appropriate or a good use of U.S. law enforcement resources to prosecute in U.S. courts all of the persons who might
fall within the [described] categories.” To account for this concern, he proposed a provision stating that no prosecution should be undertaken unless
the Attorney General or their designee determined that “such a prosecution
would be in the public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice.” 65
Notwithstanding this strong support within the State and Defense Departments, the Department of Justice apparently resisted expanding the jurisdictional bases to prosecute grave breaches of the Conventions 66 given the
62. Hearing on H.R. 2587, supra note 49, at 13.
63. Matheson, House of Representatives Testimony, supra note 58.
64. Hearing on H.R. 2587, supra note 49, at 16–17.
65. Id. at 10–11.
66. The Department of Justice’s position on the propriety of the United States asserting
jurisdiction over international crimes has evolved considerably since this time. Indeed, in
opposing the passage of the Torture Victim Protection Act, which created a civil cause of
action, a DOJ representative argued for the ratification of the Convention Against Torture
and the creation of implementing legislation to enable domestic prosecutions. See Torture
Victim Protection Act, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 33-4 (1989) (testimony of John O. McGinnis,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice). The
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legal, practical, and diplomatic obstacles to prosecuting extraterritorial conduct. 67 Ultimately, this perspective prevailed, and the House Report notes
that universal jurisdiction prosecutions might “draw the United States into
conflicts in which this country has no place and where our national interests
are slight. In addition, problems involving witnesses and evidence would
likely be daunting.” 68 The Committee also noted that no Geneva Conventions signatory had yet activated universal jurisdiction. 69 While true at the
time, signatories have since launched a number of war crimes prosecutions
in their domestic courts, significantly outpacing the United States in the enforcement of humanitarian law. 70
The U.S. War Crimes Act as originally enacted thus allowed for the prosecution of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions pursuant to the active
nationality and passive personality principles of jurisdiction. 71 The operative
provisions read:
(a) Offense.—Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a war crime, in any of the circumstances described in subsection (b),
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or
both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty
of death.
(b) Circumstances.—The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are
that the person committing such war crime or the victim of such war crime
is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the
United States . . . . 72
Department of Justice now has a specialized unit focused on international crimes. See Department of Justice, Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-hrsp. For a discussion of how the Human Rights and Special Prosecutions
Section operates and its mandate, see Madison Bingle, Holes in the United States’ “Never Again”
Promise: An Analysis on the DOJ’s Approach Toward Atrocity Accountability, 74 ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2021).
67. See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22497, EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW (Oct. 31, 2016).
68. H.R. Rep. No. 104-698, supra note 43, at 8.
69. Id.
70. A report by Trial International found that States issued seventy-six war crimes
charges predicated on universal jurisdiction in 2020 alone. TRIAL INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION ANNUAL REVIEW 2021, at 13 (2021).
71. For a discussion of the various bases of domestic jurisdiction, see United States v.
Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 n.24 (2d Cir. 2003); Introductory Comment to Research on International
Law, Part II, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 435, 445 (Supp. 1935).
72. War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a)–(b).
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Upon signing the statute into law, President Clinton expressed a commitment to work with Congress to expand the scope of the legislation to enable
the prosecution of war crimes committed by any person who comes within
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 73
A year later, the War Crimes Act was amended, as had been proposed
by the DoD. 74 The list of war crimes was expanded to include not only grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, but also violations of certain provisions of the Fourth Hague Convention Annex, 75 violations of Common Article 3, and wilful killings or serious injury to civilians committed in breach
of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, BoobyTraps and Other Devices, which the United States later ratified in 1999. 76
The first and second categories of war crimes find expression in treaties that
do not, by their own terms, contain a penal regime. By contrast, the latter
treaty obliges parties to impose penal sanctions “against persons who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of this Protocol,
wilfully kill or cause serious injury to civilians and to bring such persons to
justice.” 77 This expansion in enumerated crimes left the jurisdictional regime
unchanged.
The War Crimes Act underwent a major revision following the revelations of custodial abuses being committed at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the “Global
War on Terror,” which was being waged on the territories of several HCPs,
although not between them, constituted a NIAC subject to Common Article

73. William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the War Crimes Act of 1996 (Aug. 21,
1996), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/03/23/clintonpresst
atement-1482-1996.pdf.
74. See supra text accompanying note 53 (testimony of Miller).
75. The list of violations involves certain prohibited weapons, declaring no quarter,
perfidy, etc. (Article 23), the attack or bombardment of undefended towns, buildings, etc.
(Article 25), attacks on cultural property or humanitarian institutions (Article 27), and pillage
(Article 28). The term “war crimes” also replaced “grave breaches” in the chapeau.
76. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-118, § 583, 111 Stat. 2386 (1997).
77. Mines Protocol, supra note 60, art. 14(2).
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3. 78 With the 2006 Military Commissions Act, 79 Congress decriminalized certain war crimes when committed within a NIAC—most evidently outrages
upon personal dignity and breaches of due process protections—and specifically identified certain prosecutable “grave breaches” of Common Article
3. 80 These changes were made retroactive. The intent and effect of these
amendments was to diminish the ability to prosecute some U.S. personnel,
both for harm that fell short of torture and for undertaking trials by military
commission that did not adhere to universal due process protections. 81 It
should be noted that these changes only applied to U.S. personnel not subject to the UCMJ, which remained unchanged. The military justice framework, when coupled with the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction
Act and Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, has allowed for the prosecution of such acts by military personnel and some civilians who accompany
them (although charges have been denominated as ordinary common law
crimes, such as assault and battery, rather than war crimes per se). 82
At the same time, Congress also arguably expanded, or at least elaborated
upon, the list of potential NIAC war crimes by specifically enumerating rape
and other forms of sexual violence within the so-called “grave breaches” of
Common Article 3, so such conduct can be now prosecuted as such rather

78. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–31 (2006). This conclusion ran counter to
a memorandum authored by two OLC lawyers who argued that the War Crimes Act would
not apply to the detention or trial of persons captured during the Afghanistan conflict.
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, & Robert Delahunty,
Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense,
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002),
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/documents/20020109.pdf. The administration had argued that while the conflict with al Qaeda was “international,” it was outside
the scope of the Geneva Conventions altogether. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice
of the United States, 96 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 475 (2002).
79. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 950t).
80. Although the term “grave breaches” relates to breaches of the Geneva Conventions
that constitute war crimes under IHL, this term is not utilized in, or in connection with,
Common Article 3. Congressman Jones, to his credit, opposed these amendments on the
ground that they weakened the War Crimes Act. Brundage, supra note 47.
81. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33662, THE WAR CRIMES ACT:
CURRENT ISSUES (Oct. 2, 2006) (discussing legislative history of the Military Commissions
Act).
82. See Corn & VanLandingham, supra note 4.
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than under the rubric of torture or cruel treatment. 83 As a result of the Military Commissions Act, the United States can currently prosecute the following crimes when committed in a NIAC: torture, cruel or inhuman treatment,
murder, mutilation or maiming, intentionally causing serious bodily injury,
rape, sexual assault or abuse, and the taking of hostages. Congress also defined the conduct that constitutes “cruel treatment” similarly to that which
constitutes torture, thus shortening the spectrum of mistreatment that may
be prosecuted in U.S. courts even further. 84 The Military Commissions Act
notes that even though elements of Common Article 3 were decriminalized,
the United States is still bound by the full scope of that provision in its international relations and remains obliged to repress such acts by its personnel
in ways other than via criminal sanctions. 85
In 2008, and following the United States’ ratification of the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 86 Congress
enacted a new war crimes statute focused on the recruitment or use of child
soldiers. 87 The statute, which enjoyed strong bipartisan support, 88 allows the
83. The ad hoc tribunals have confirmed that sexual violence can be prosecuted as torture. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002).
84. See Beth Van Schaack, Amending the Amendments: The War Crimes Act of 1996,
INTLAWGRRLS (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2009/04/obama-administration-is-receiving-no.html; Michael J. Matheson, The Amendment of the War Crimes Act, 101
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, 52 (2007) (critiquing amendments to the
War Crimes Act implemented by the Military Commissions Act and concluding that the
“net effect [of the amendments] is not to achieve greater clarity but, rather, to limit in an
uncertain way the scope of acts to which criminal sanctions apply”).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(5) (“The definitions in this subsection are intended only to
define the grave breaches of common Article 3 and not the full scope of United States
obligations under that Article.”).
86. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement
of Children in Armed Conflict, Nov. 14, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222. See generally Jo Becker,
From Opponent to Ally: The United States and Efforts to End the Use of Child Soldiers, 22 MICHIGAN
STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 595 (2014) (discussing gradual U.S. embrace of the
prohibition on the use of child soldiers given that the United States has historically recruited
17-year-olds with parental consent). See Declaration and Understandings by the United
States to the Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=595&ps=P (scroll to the entry for
the United States of America and select the document at “23.12.2002”).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2442. For a discussion, see Chris Moxley, It’s Time to Revisit the United
States’ Evolving Posture Toward the Use of Child Soldiers, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 21, 2021).
88. See Dani Cepernich, Fighting for Asylum: A Statutory Exception to Relevant Bars for Former
Child Soldiers, 83 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1099, 1112 (2010).
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United States to prosecute anyone who knowingly recruits, enlists, or conscripts a person under fifteen years of age to serve in an armed force or group
or who uses a child to participate actively in hostilities. There is jurisdiction
over this offense if committed by U.S. nationals and legal permanent residents, stateless persons with habitual residence in the United States, or aliens
who are present in the United States, irrespective of nationality, or if the
offense occurs in whole or in part within the United States. 89 So far, no one
has been prosecuted under this statute, but it has served as the basis for the
deportation of individuals who stand accused of recruiting or using child
soldiers in conflict, even if prior to the statute’s enactment. 90
In summation, as the War Crimes Act currently stands, federal prosecutors can charge grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and enumerated
breaches of the Annex of the Fourth Hague Convention in connection with
IACs; certain violations of Common Article 3 in connection with NIACs;
certain weapons offenses involving mines and booby traps regardless of conflict classification; and the recruitment or use of child soldiers, also across
the conflict spectrum. With the exception of the latter set of crimes involving
child soldiers, these other war crimes are only prosecutable when they are
committed by or against U.S. persons. As originally suggested by the State
Department, approval from the Assistant Attorney General or their designee
is required before any prosecution can go forward. 91 All told, the War Crimes
Act goes farther than what IHL treaties require of HCPs in some ways, such
as by criminalizing certain treaty violations—e.g., of Common Article 3—
that are not subject to a conventional penal regime. 92 However, when it
comes to the jurisdictional regime vis-à-vis grave breaches, the statute falls
short of what the Geneva Conventions require. Despite this expansive list
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2442(c).
90. George Boley, active in the 1989–2003 Liberian Civil War, was the first person
deported for using child soldiers. See Liberia Ex-Warlord George Boley to be Deported from US,
BBC (Feb. 7, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16924744; Press Release,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Liberian Human Rights Violator Removed
from US (Mar. 29, 2012), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/liberian-human-rights-violator-removed-us.
91. See Sec. 9-2.139 of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-92000-authority-us-attorney-criminal-division-mattersprior-approvals#9-2.139 (updated Jan.
2021).
92. The ICRC contends that customary international law mandates States to penalize
war crimes beyond those designated as “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions, including war crimes addressed to the means and methods of warfare and war crimes committed in NIACs. See Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Customary IHL Database, supra note 13, r.
158 (Prosecution of War Crimes).
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of prosecutable war crimes, not a single prosecution has occurred under the
War Crimes Act since its inception more than twenty-five years ago. The
remainder of this chapter will discuss why and offer targeted suggestions to
rectify this unfortunate state of affairs.
IV.

POTENTIAL AMENDMENTS TO THE WAR CRIMES STATUTE

A. Expand the Act’s Jurisdictional Reach
Starting with the in personam jurisdictional regime, and as discussed in connection with its legislative history, the statute allows for the prosecution of
war crimes committed abroad, but only if the perpetrator or victim is a U.S.
citizen or member of the U.S. Armed Forces. In this way, the War Crimes
Act stands in stark contrast to other U.S. statutes devoted to the prosecution
of international crimes. Over the years, Congress has enacted a number of
other atrocity crimes legislation criminalizing a range of acts of terrorism,
various forms of human trafficking and slavery, genocide, piracy, the killing
of internationally protected persons, and torture. In contradistinction to the
War Crimes Act, the United States can prosecute individuals suspected of
committing these other international offenses if they are found or present in
the United States. 93 The terms “found in” or “present in” are interpreted
literally and generally apply regardless of the circumstances in which the person is present, or brought to, the United States. 94 Given this jurisdictional
asymmetry in U.S. law, the United States stands as an outlier among its
friends and allies abroad that have more faithfully implemented their Geneva

93. See Beth Van Schaack, The Unexceptional Nature of the South African Universal Jurisdiction
Law, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/4569/unexceptionalnature-south-african-universal-jurisdiction-law/ (discussing the United States’ suite of international crimes statutes). See generally David Scheffer, Closing the Impunity Gap in U.S. Law, 8
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 30, 32 (2009) (“There
should be consistent application of the rules of jurisdiction in the coverage of atrocity crimes
in the federal criminal code.”).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091–92 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding
jurisdiction under the Hostage Taking Act and Antihijacking Act where the defendant was
lured to, and arrested in, international waters and brought to the United States by federal
agents).
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Convention obligations and modernized their penal codes to reflect the current state of international criminal law. 95
Aligning the War Crimes Act with these other statutes should be an easy
fix. Congress could simply insert the language from § 2442(c) of the Child
Soldiers Act into the War Crimes Act or incorporate those provisions by
reference. 96 Indeed, Congress should explore whether it can render this jurisdictional change retroactive to 1996 when the War Crimes Act was first
enacted. Such a change might not offend the ex post facto clause 97 since it
would not penalize conduct that was lawful when committed but rather open
up the possibility of prosecuting conduct before a federal forum that was
already unlawful under domestic and international law. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights indicates that new legislation that penalizes conduct already deemed criminal under international law does not
violate the principle of legality, nullum crimen sine lege. 98 Congress in 2007 made
a similar change to the genocide statute, 99 but did not render these changes
retroactive, notwithstanding debates in the record. 100 The passage of time
would not impede the prosecution of earlier war crimes if they involve the
95. See Beth Van Schaack & Zarko Perovic, The Prevalence of Present In Jurisdiction, 107
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 237 (2013) (compiling statutes and incorporation trends); Int’l Comm. Red Cross, National Implementation of
IHL, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl-nat (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2442(c).
97. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) (“The ex
post facto prohibition forbids the Congress and the States to enact any law ‘which imposes a
punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes
additional punishment to that then prescribed.’ ”); United States v. Mohammad, 398 F.Supp.
3d 1233, 1241 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2019) (noting congressional intent to codify existing law within
the Military Commissions Act in the form of offenses that had been traditionally triable by
military commission).
98. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (“Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person
for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according
to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.”). See generally Eric
S. Kobrick, The Ex Post Facto Prohibition and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction over International
Crimes, 87 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1515 (1987).
99. See Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-151, 121 Stat. 1821, ¶ 2
(allowing for prosecutions for genocide if the crime is committed within the United States
or if the perpetrator is a U.S. national, is lawfully admitted for permanent residence, is stateless but makes their habitual residence in the United States, or is “brought into, or found in,
the United States, even if that conduct occurred outside the United States”).
100. Genocide and the Rule of Law, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 31, 37 (2007).
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death of the victim, but other war crimes are subject to a five-year statute of
limitations (with potential tolling), which can be a barrier to prosecution as
well, particularly in complex cases where it may be years before a perpetrator,
victim, or witness surfaces in the United States or evidence can be compiled. 101 This proposed jurisdictional amendment would expand the reach of
the moribund War Crimes Act and render it a more powerful tool to address
the presence of war criminals in our midst. 102
B. Re-Interpret the Concept of “Protected Persons”
The limitations on the War Crimes Act’s jurisdictional reach are obvious on
the face of the statute. Less so are interpretations of the underlying law-ofwar concepts that have rendered the statute more difficult to invoke. In particular, the OLC during the administration of George W. Bush promulgated
unsupported interpretations and guidance on the Geneva Conventions that
significantly limited the circumstances in which the War Crimes Act could
be invoked in the context of IACs. 103 The majority of these memoranda were
revoked; 104 two, however, escaped this deserved fate. Each attempts to limit
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (indicating that capital crimes, such as certain war crimes,
are imprescriptible). Indeed, international law contains no statute of limitations for international crimes generally. See Beth Van Schaack, International Crimes and Statutes of Limitation,
INTLAWGRRLS (Oct. 30, 2008), http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2008/10/internationalcrimes-and-statutes-of.html. Congress should consider extending or eliminating the statute
of limitations for § 2441 as has been done for other international crimes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 3286.
102. Without “present in” jurisdiction, the United States has had to utilize immigration
remedies to address suspected war criminals found on U.S. soil. See Beth Van Schaack, Salvadoran General Deemed Deportable in the Absence of Criminal Charges, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 17,
2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/21146/salvadoran-general-deemed-deportable/.
103. A series of interlocking memoranda emanating from the OLC undergirded the
post-9/11 detention and interrogation system. These memos and more on the U.S. torture
program are available in the Torture Database maintained by the American Civil Liberties
Union, which won the public release of many of these memoranda through litigation. See
ACLU, The Torture Database, www.thetorturedatabase.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2021). They
can also be found in the OLC’s Freedom of Information Act Reading Room. See U.S. Department of Justice, OLC FOIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.justice.gov/olc/olcfoia-electronic-reading-room (last visited Nov. 4, 2021). See generally Steven Aftergood, OLC
Torture Memos Declassified, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (Apr. 17, 2009),
https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2009/04/olc_torture_memos/.
104. Some of these were revoked during the Bush administration when they came to
light; others were repudiated by President Barack Obama. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13491,
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the definition of “protected persons” in GCIV to individuals in occupied territory or enemy aliens in U.S. custody on U.S. territory, thus excluding all enemy
aliens in non-occupied territory from protection. The memos’ approach was
subsequently echoed in the DoD Law of War Manual. 105 This reasoning guts
the protections of the treaty when the United States—or any other HCP that
adopts the same approach—projects its military power abroad without occupying territory and detains or mistreats civilians and other persons protected by GCIV. This interpretation has consequences for the prosecution
of grave breaches as well because it limits the categories of civilians who can
be deemed the victims of war crimes under GCIV and thus under the War
Crimes Act, which incorporates the concept of protected persons.
During the Bush administration, OLC lawyers promulgated two memoranda purporting to clarify the concept of “protected persons” in GCIV—
one devoted to occupied Iraq and one devoted to the conflict in Afghanistan.
The Iraq memorandum, authored by Professor Jack Goldsmith in 2004, argues that the protections provided to “protected persons” by GCIV apply
only to two classes of civilians: those in occupied territory or those on the
home territory of the HCP in whose hands they are. 106 This is even though
the Convention makes multiple references to the rights enjoyed, and the responsibilities of, protected persons who are in the “territory of a Party [i.e.,
any Party] to the conflict.” 107 The intent of the memorandum was to establish
that the United States owed no treaty-based treatment obligations toward al
Qaeda members or operatives captured by U.S. forces in occupied Iraq who
do not qualify as POWs, 108 notwithstanding multiple U.S. detention centers

74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/ensuring-lawful-interrogations.
105. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF
WAR MANUAL § 10.3.2.2. (rev. ed. 2016).
106. Memorandum, Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney General, “Protected Person” Status in Occupied Iraq under the Fourth Geneva Convention, 28 OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE
OF LEGAL COUNSEL 35 (2004), https://www.justice.gov/file/18871/download. Note that
the memo does not fully explore the outer reaches of the concept of “partial” occupation,
which might encompass a detention center controlled by a foreign force even if the entire
territory is not under occupation.
107. See, e.g., GCIV, supra note 17, sec. II.
108. The memorandum also treated the conflict in occupied Iraq as separate from the
conflict with al Qaida and argued that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to the latter
because al Qaida is not a HCP. Goldsmith, supra note 106, at 39.
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there, including the notorious Abu Ghraib prison. 109 Although Goldsmith
conceded that some unprivileged combatants (including Iraqi nationals)
would fall within the scope of “protected persons” if they “find themselves”
in Iraqi occupied territory, 110 he went on to argue that non-Iraqi al Qaida
operatives deliberately traveled to Iraq as part of a transnational terrorist network and so did not passively “find themselves” there. 111
The second memorandum, authored by Howard C. Nielson Jr. in 2005,
follows suit but is focused on persons captured and detained by the United
States in Afghanistan. 112 Like Goldsmith, whose memo is only cited once in
passing, Nielson concludes that GCIV does not apply to persons captured
by a party to the conflict in territory belonging to its enemy (or elsewhere).
Lest his readers be concerned about stripping civilians of any rights or protections in unoccupied territory, he insists that the Hague Regulations do
apply in such contexts (although not in Afghanistan, which is not a party). 113
These latter rules, however, do not speak to custodial abuses of civilians, or
contain a penal regime, which mark the legal innovations embodied within
the four Geneva Conventions.
Oddly, the latter memo is dated 2005, long after the conflict in Afghanistan had shifted from an international to a non-international armed conflict
following the fall of the Taliban and the 2002 loya jirga. 114 This suggests that
the memo was not really meant to govern operations in Afghanistan ex ante,
but was rather geared toward subsequent IACs while also laying the argumentative groundwork for a set of defenses against future accountability efforts. Its timing and framing “to the file” also runs counter to the OLC’s normal practice, which is to “render[] formal opinions addressed to particular
policy proposals and not undertak[e] a general survey of a broad area of the

109. See Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Background on U.S. Detention Facilities in Iraq (May 7,
2004), https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/05/07/iraq-background-us-detention-facilitiesiraq.
110. Goldsmith, supra note 106, at 49.
111. Id. at 14–15.
112. Memorandum, Howard C. Nielson Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Whether Persons Captured and Detained in Afghanistan are “Protected Persons” under the
Fourth Geneva Convention (Aug. 5, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/12/30/aclu-ii-080505.pdf.
113. Id. at 28.
114. See Francoise Hampson, Afghanistan 2001 Onwards, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 242, 251, 255 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012).
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law or address[] general or amorphous hypothetical scenarios involving difficult questions of law.” 115 In fact, Nielson may have directed this memo to
the file to avoid the ordinary interagency clearance process, which would
have invited the State Department Legal Adviser’s office, the government
in-house experts on international law, to weigh in. 116
Both memos turn on the definition of protected persons in GCIV: “Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in
any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation,
in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are
not nationals.” 117 GCIV makes clear that “protected persons” include individuals who do not enjoy protection under one of the other three Conventions—which are dedicated to the wounded and sick, the shipwrecked, and
prisoners of war—but exclude nationals of the HCP itself, 118 neutral States,
co-belligerents, or non-party States who are “in the territory of a belligerent
state.” 119 These exclusions are based on the theory that these individuals will
ordinarily enjoy the diplomatic protection of their State of nationality. The
point of the four treaties was to ensure that all individuals caught up in an
IAC have some sort of protection—from either the norms of diplomatic
protection or international law. As the ICRC’s commentary states: “[e]very
person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he is
either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a
civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the med-

115. Memorandum, Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Jan. 15, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memostatusolcopinions01152009.pdf; see also Memorandum, David Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written
Opinions (July 16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2014/07/11/olc-best-practices-2010.pdf.
116. Beth Van Schaack, Judicial Nominee Howard C. Nielson’s Own Torture Memo, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/50290/judicial-nominee-howard-cnielsons-torture-memo/.
117. GCIV, supra note 17, art. 4(1).
118. Note that the ICTY—operating in the context of an inter-ethnic conflict in which
the bonds of ethnicity offered more meaningful protection than the bonds of formal nationality—extended the protections of GCIV to the nationals of the custodial State in reliance on the object and purpose of GCIV. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 163–71 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
119. Id. (“Persons protected by [GC I–III] shall not be considered as protected persons
within the meaning of the present Convention.”)
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ical personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the
law.” 120 It continues: “The Convention is quite definite on this point: all persons who find themselves in the hands of a Party to the conflict or an Occupying Power of which they are not nationals are protected persons. No
loophole is left.” 121 This blanket coverage, it should be noted, is embraced
by the contemporaneous U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land
Warfare, which stated that “those protected by [GCIV] also include all persons who have engaged in hostile or belligerent conduct but who are not
entitled to treatment as prisoners of war.” 122
After identifying the persons protected by the treaty, the text sets forth
a number of protections owed to such persons who are “in the territory of
a Party to the conflict,” 123 whether occupied or not. Both OLC authors concede that this latter phrase could be interpreted to include any circumstances
in which a HCP to an IAC acts upon a person who is not a national, so long
as none of the other exceptions to the protected persons category applies. 124
But both authors go on to insist that the phrase “territory of a Party to the
conflict” should actually be read as “home territory of the detaining Party to the
conflict.” 125 While there is no question that communities under occupation
and enemy nationals in a party’s home territory are particularly vulnerable
and deserving of protection under the treaty—and, indeed, several provisions are dedicated to these two scenarios—it takes considerable linguistic
gymnastics to conclude that the treaties provide no protections to enemy
nationals in the custody of a party operating on enemy territory outside of a
situation of occupation. Rather, the treaty commentary makes clear that:
120. INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE
TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 51 (Jean Pictet ed., Ronald
Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958) (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 60.
122. See also FM 27-10, supra note 33, ¶ 247b; see also id. ¶ 73 (“If a person is determined
by a competent tribunal . . . not to fall within any of the categories listed in Article 4, GPW
[GCIII], he is not entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war. He is, however, a protected
person within the meaning of [GCIV].”).
123. GCIV, supra note 17, art. 4.
124. Goldsmith, supra note 106, at 41, 45–46 (same with “in the territory of a belligerent
State”).
125. Id. at 41. This memo also tries to get some mileage out of the phrase “find themselves” to include only Iraqi citizens already resident in Iraq (who are subject to occupation
by “happenstance or coincidence”) and not members of al Qaida who are present by virtue
of “deliberate action” as “willing agents of an international terrorist organization engaged
in a global armed conflict.” Id. at 14–15.
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The relations between the civilian population of a territory and troops advancing into that territory, whether fighting or not, are governed by the present
Convention. There is no intermediate period between what might be
termed the invasion phase and the inauguration of a stable regime of occupation. Even a patrol which penetrates into enemy territory without any intention
of staying there must respect the Conventions in its dealings with the civilians it meets. 126

By contrast, the memos would create gaps in protection that run counter
to the treaty’ ethos of seamless coverage. For example, as applied to World
War II, GCIV’s protective provisions would address individuals of Japanese
nationality held in internment centers in the United States (the subject of the
impugned Korematsu decision 127) but not U.S. citizens captured by the Japanese and held outside of Japan, such as on mainland China. 128 When applied
to contemporary conflicts, this interpretation would render GCIV almost
entirely irrelevant to internment operations in Afghanistan involving nonPOWs during the period of time when the conflict was an international one
(since it was not occupied and there were no hostilities on U.S. territory).
Nor would it apply to so-called “black sites” established outside either battlespace but under U.S. control. 129 Indeed, if this theory of the treaty were to
prevail, United States personnel could torture civilians without breaching the
treaty—so long as they did so outside the United States and without occupying the enemy’s territory. Under the same reasoning, U.S. adversaries
could harm U.S. civilians in their custody, so long as the victims were not
brought back to the territory of the belligerent in question. Because embattled States are unlikely to transfer large swaths of an enemy civilian population into their own territory, the impact of the GCIV under the impugned
interpretation would be significantly diminished.

126. INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, supra note 120, at 60 (emphasis added).
127. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
128. See 50 U.S.C. § 4104 (offering compensation for U.S. citizens captured by Japan at
Midway and other U.S. territories).
129. See European Court of Human Rights Press Unit, Fact Sheet - Secret Detention
Sites (Mar. 2019), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Secret_detention_ENG.
PDF.
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Although they claim theirs is the most “clear” or “natural” reading of the
treaty language, 130 the collective reasoning of the two ex-OLC lawyers is altogether too convoluted to replicate in its entirety here. 131 Suffice it to say
that this position ignores—or requires a revision of—important passages of
the treaty, 132 perceives ambiguities where none exist, rests upon tortuous and
over-determined conclusions drawn from the structure of the treaty, gathers
snippets out of context from the travaux préparatoires, misrepresents the limited IHL scholarship that is cited and ignores other mainstream interpretations, and does violence to the object and purpose of GCIV. It also disregards the many circumstances that animated the promulgation of the Fourth
Convention. This includes Axis depredations in enemy territory during
World War II (such as harm to civilians during and following the brutal annexation and effective dissolution of Poland, the deportations of foreign
Jews from the Western European nations prior to their occupation by the
Nazis, and the literal and figurative rape of Nanjing). It also includes prior
conflict situations that involved harm to civilians in enemy hands absent a
state of occupation, such as the Boxer Rebellion of 1899–1901, the RussoJapanese War of 1904–5 (which was largely fought in Korea and Manchuria),
and World War I abuses of civilians in colonial territories or army staging
areas. These are the events that would have been top of mind among the
Geneva Conventions’ drafters. 133 Further, neither author grapples with the
implications of their preferred interpretation for GCIII, which defines its
protected persons—prisoners of war—as “persons belonging to one of the
following categories [e.g., members of an armed force or militia belonging
to a HCP], who have fallen into the power of the enemy.” 134 If this same
approach were applied to GCIII, combatants in enemy custody might be
130. See Goldsmith, supra note 106, at 41; Nielson, supra note 112, at 6.
131. For more detailed arguments, see Beth Van Schaack, Memo to President Obama: You
Have Another Memo to Withdraw, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/35236/memo-president-obama-memo-withdraw/; Beth Van Schaack, Parsing Howard Nielson’s Sources: A Thesis Without Support, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/50739/parsing-howard-nielsons-sources-thesis-support/.
132. GCIV, supra note 17, art. 13 (“The provisions of Part II [General Protection of
Populations Against Certain Consequences of War] cover the whole of the populations of
the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion, and are intended to alleviate the sufferings caused by
war.”).
133. See generally MATTHEW STIBBE, CIVILIAN INTERNMENT DURING THE FIRST
WORLD WAR (2019) (discussing harm to civilians in World War I, including in extraterritorial zones).
134. GCIII, supra note 17, art. 4(A).
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entitled to protections only if they were detained in the enemy’s home territory, which occurs but does not encompass all wartime custodial arrangements. 135
Given the timing of the memoranda and the scrutiny being applied to
the United States’ war-on-terror detention operations, these anxious reinterpretations were clearly motivated less by a desire to strip protections from
civilians—in the colloquial sense of “innocent” non-combatants—and more
by concerns that GCIV might be deemed to apply to armed actors captured
in these two battlespaces who were not entitled to POW status but who
might be deserving of some protections under GCIV. 136 Otherwise, the mistreatment of such individuals would constitute war crimes prosecutable under the War Crimes Act. The Biden administration should withdraw these
two memoranda (and direct the Department of Defense to make the necessary conforming amendments to the Law of War Manual) in order to confirm its understanding of the more expansive application of the Geneva Conventions in IACs and also signal a repudiation of earlier efforts to exempt
U.S. actions from the reach of the Conventions. 137 Doing so would ensure
that the United States can prosecute individuals who mistreat persons protected by GCIV in unoccupied enemy territory. In addition, in the event that
Congress takes up the jurisdictional amendments encouraged above, it
should advance the appropriate interpretation of the concept of “protected
persons” in GCIV in legislative findings and the legislative history.

135. See Robert H. Cole, A Survey of United States Detainee Doctrine and Experience
Since World War II 1–2 (2006), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a449746.pdf
(noting that the United States operated numerous detention facilities at home and across
Europe in connection with World War II).
136. Importantly, GCIV contains a regime of internment and prosecution to address
the presence of individuals who pose a security threat to a HCP. See, e.g., GCIV, supra note
17, art. 79.
137. It is not clear if these memoranda continue to reflect the OLC’s position (particularly the Nielson memo, which was not formally published). OLC memoranda are available
on the OLC’s Freedom of Information Reading Room, which contains the disclaimer that
“[a]lthough these records may be of public or historical interest, the views expressed in some
of these records may not reflect the Office’s current views.” See Department of Justice, OLC
FOIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.justice.gov/olc/olc-foia-electronic-readingroom (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
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C. Dispense with the Need to Engage in Conflict Classification
The above discussion sheds light on another major obstacle to utilizing the
War Crimes Act: conflict classification. The statute tracks the underlying
treaties and bifurcates its recitation of war crimes into those that can be prosecuted in IACs (inter alia, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions when
committed against protected persons and enumerated breaches of the Hague
Convention Annex) versus those that can be prosecuted in NIACs (viz. the
idiosyncratic enumerated “grave breaches” of Common Article 3). 138 The
classification of the conflict is thus an element of each offense that must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. While this may seem like a facile exercise,
today’s conflicts are quite complex, may morph from international to noninternational (and vice versa) over time, and may contain both international
and non-international components simultaneously. 139 Consider, for the moment, the conflict in Syria, which pits the Assad regime, with Russian and
Iranian support, against the Syrian opposition and ISIL, who are themselves
embattled with each other. This conflict also features a multinational antiISIL coalition, which generally avoided engaging regime targets and that may
(or may not) be operating with tacit Syrian consent against a common foe,
and involves Turkey, which has attacked Kurdish militias in receipt of various forms of support from Western governments and occupies part of
Syria. 140
As this example reveals, conflict classification in ambiguous operational
environments can occasion some thorny legal and political elements when it
comes to charging and sources of proof. In particular, establishing the
charged conflict classification may require recourse to classified or sensitive
material and would put the U.S. government on record with respect to classification in ways that might complicate (to put it mildly) its foreign relations.
Charging in the alternative is not an option, and any information tending to
suggest that a set of events charged as a NIAC are actually an IAC (or vice
versa) might constitute exonerating evidence that would need to be disclosed
138. See Rogier Bartels, The Classification of Armed Conflicts by International Criminal Courts
and Tribunals, 20 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 595 (2020).
139. See generally William J. Fenrick, The Application of the Geneva Conventions by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 81 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS 317 (1999) (discussing complexity of conflict classification as the former Yugoslavia
dissolved).
140. Terry D. Gill, Classifying the Conflict in Syria, 92 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 353
(2016).
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to the defense. 141 And, while there is no requirement to gain inter-agency
consensus on conflict classification, 142 there may be circumstances in which
other agencies disagree with the Department of Justice’s determination,
which itself might be discoverable. Given this complexity, it may come as no
surprise that prosecutors are unwilling to take the considerable risks in the
courtroom of invoking the War Crimes Act, particularly when they can more
easily charge material support for terrorism 143 or utilize immigration remedies against offenders, 144 which proceed under a lower burden of proof. 145
All told, retaining this bifurcation creates real charging headaches that could
be alleviated were the War Crimes Act to reflect the status of customary
international law and list all prosecutable war crimes in one go, regardless of
classification.
This conundrum reflects the fact that although the IHL governing IACs
and NIACs is converging in important respects, conflict classification remains a pertinent exercise. As mentioned, the 1949 Geneva Conventions
primarily apply to IACs, defined at Common Article 2 as “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them,” or situations of occupation. 146 This definition thus
requires the presence of at least two HCPs embattled against each other but
does not encompass conflicts involving multiple States on the same side.
During the drafting of the four Geneva Conventions, the ICRC and some
State delegates proposed more detailed rules for NIACs. In the face of steep
resistance, all that was achieved was the laconic, yet important, Common
Article 3, which applies in cases “of armed conflict not of an international
141. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
142. There are some criminal statutes that mandate interagency consultation. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 1119 (requiring the Attorney General to consult with the Secretary of State about
the ability of the territorial State to secure a suspect’s presence).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
144. Alexandra Insinga, Mohammed Jabbateh Conviction: A Human Rights Trial Cloaked in
Immigration Crimes, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/46801/mohammed-jabbateh-conviction-human-rights-trial-cloaked-immigrationcrimes/. This has been described as the “Al Capone” approach to international law. Annie
Hylton, How the U.S. Became a Haven for War Criminals, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 29, 2019).
145. See generally Jamie Rowen & Rebecca Hamlin, The Politics of a New Legal Regime:
Governing International Crime Through Domestic Immigration Law, 40 LAW & POLICY 243, 250
(2018).
146. GCIV, supra note 17, art. 2. The treaties apply from this point in “the territory of
Parties to the conflict” until “the general close of military operations” or the dissolution of
the occupation. Id. art. 6.
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character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”
The latter terminology is employed in lieu of “civil war” or “internal war” to
encompass the entire range of conflicts that do not meet the somewhat technical and unintuitive definition of “international armed conflict” contained
in Article 2. The only textual requirement for the applicability of Common
Article 3 is the occurrence of an “armed conflict” within “the territory” of a
HCP.
This deceptively simple bifurcation was further complicated by the
promulgation of Protocol I, which expanded the definition of IAC to include
“armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right
of self-determination.” 147 By elevating these conflicts to the status of IACs,
the Protocol to a certain degree invokes the “just war” tradition of the jus ad
bellum. The United States resisted this change, reasoning that it granted a political advantage to certain liberation movements. 148
Protocol II elaborates on the minimum rules in Common Article 3 and
reflects a trend toward a greater acceptance of the need to regulate conflicts
that do not fall within the bailiwick of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Protocol II also contains a more precise, and stricter, test for its field of application than that within Common Article 3. Article 1 states:
1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing
conditions or application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not
covered by [Protocol I] and which take place in the territory of a High
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or
other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts
of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.

Thus, Protocol II does not apply until the NIAC involves armed groups under responsible command that have sufficient control over territory to
launch “sustained and concerted” military operations and also to conduct
147. Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 1(4).
148. Reagan, supra note 40.
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their operations in accordance with the rules of war contained in the Protocol. Moreover, Protocol II arguably applies only to conflicts between a
State’s armed forces and rebel or dissident movements (and not to conflicts
between such militia). During the drafting process, the United States expressed resistance to Protocol II’s higher standard 149 and indicated that it
intended to ratify the treaty with an understanding that the United States
would apply Protocol II to all NIACs. 150 Common Article 3, by comparison,
applies to all armed conflicts between non-State groups competing for power
or resources within a State, even when the central government is not involved or has ceased to exist. Common Article 3 also applies to those civil
wars in which guerilla forces lack any fixed location from which to exercise
territorial control or are not led by responsible command. And it also applies
to conflicts that may cross borders and pit nation States against transnational
non-State actors, such as al Qaida or the Islamic State—a position originally
rejected by the U.S. government but later confirmed by the U.S. Supreme
Court. 151
A further wrinkle in the exercise of conflict classification involves conflicts that appear to be NIACs in the sense that a State’s military is embattled
against rebel or insurrectionary forces, but that involve significant intervention by other nation States in support of the non-State actor(s). In situations
in which this outside involvement rises to the level of “overall control,” a
conflict that appears to be a NIAC can become internationalized and thus

149. See Martin P. Dupuis et al., The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College
of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law
and the 1977 Protocols Addition to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 415, 430 (1987) (quoting Michael Matheson expressing support for the enforcement provisions of Protocol II: “This is a narrower scope than we and
other Western delegations would have desired and it has the effect of excluding many internal conflicts in which dissident armed groups occupy no significant territory but conduct
sporadic guerrilla operations over a wide area.”).
150. Id. (“Because of these limitations, we have recommended that United States ratification be subject to an understanding declaring that the United States will apply the Protocol to all conflicts covered by common article 3 of the 1949 Conventions, thus including
all non-international armed conflicts as traditionally defined.”)
151. See Goldsmith memo, supra note 106, at 52 n.20 (arguing that Common Article 3
applies only to conflicts that are “purely internal to a State, such as civil wars and related domestic insurgency” and not transnational conflicts against international terrorist organizations) (emphasis in original). But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006) (soundly
rejecting this argument).
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governed by the rules that apply to all IACs. 152 A complicating factor is that
some confusion exists in the literature as to whether the test is actually one
of “effective control,” which suggests a slightly higher standard. 153 In either
case, when a State is supporting a non-State actor embattled against another
State, there is a threshold of control that, when surpassed, can transform a
NIAC into an IAC.
Viewed collectively, the Geneva treaty regime thus establishes a taxonomy of conflict classification that includes the following:
(a) situations that do not trigger IHL at all because the violence has not
reached the necessary level of intensity and the parties remain insufficiently
organized154 (e.g., riots, sporadic acts of violence);
(b) NIACs that do not meet the heightened requirements of Protocol II but
that still trigger Common Article 3’s protections;
(c) NIACs between a State and armed groups that meet the heightened organizational and territorial control requirements of Protocol II;
(d) IACs within the meaning of Protocol I (e.g., situations in which an indigenous population is resisting colonial domination);
(e) sufficiently internationalized armed conflicts that trigger the greater part
of the protections of the 1949 Geneva Conventions when a State exercises
sufficient control over a non-State actor embattled against another State
within the conflict; and
(f) traditional IACs pitting two HCPs against each other.
The latter three scenarios trigger the bulk of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
including their penal regimes.
Notwithstanding these textual realities, the ad hoc criminal tribunals
made quick work of dismantling distinctions between the norms applicable
in international and non-international armed conflicts that were so carefully
crafted by States during the IHL treaty-drafting process. As a result, much
deleterious conduct prohibited or criminalized in IACs now constitutes a
152. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 122–23 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000) (finding the Republic of Croatia exercised overall control over Bosnian Croats embattled in Bosnia-Herzegovina).
153. See Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 237–38 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2017) (comparing the two standards); Stefan
A. G. Talmon, The Responsibility of Outside Powers for Acts of Secessionist Entities, 58 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 493 (2009).
154. See Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (discussing when IHL is triggered).
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war crime even if committed in internal or other NIACs. With respect to the
ICTY, this process was enabled by the formulation of the war crimes provisions within the ICTY Statute. 155 Article 2 of the Statute reproduced the
grave breaches regime of the Geneva Conventions, and thus applied only to
IACs. Article 3, by contrast, extended the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to
cover “violations of the laws and customs of war,” including a non-exhaustive list of violations of the regulations accompanying the Fourth Hague
Convention. The Tribunal interpreted this latter provision expansively to penalize violations of Common Article 3 as well as other prohibitions within
the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols that were not designated as
“grave breaches,” finding authority for this assertion in customary international law rather than treaty law. 156
In penalizing violations of Common Article 3 and Protocol II under a
customary international law rubric, the ICTY essentially merged the law governing international and non-international armed conflicts, rendering conflict classification a virtually irrelevant exercise in its proceedings. The Appeals Chamber in Tadić was quite self-conscious about this, having found
that national practice and the inroads made by the international human rights
regime into areas traditionally shrouded by State sovereignty have “blur[red]
the traditional dichotomy between international wars and civil strife.” 157 In
addition, as most global conflicts are now non-international in character (in
the sense that they are not inter-State), the distinction between the two bodies of law seemed increasingly arbitrary and outmoded to the judges of the
modern tribunals. 158 This merger—a function of the Security Council creating an opening in the ICTY Statute for judicial interpretation—now finds
155. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and
S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by the Security Council in Resolution 827 on May 25, 1993,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
156. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 86–90 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006) (allowing for the prosecution for the war crime
of terrorizing the civilian population).
157. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (“Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban
rape, torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals . . . when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from the same bans or providing the same protection when
armed violence has erupted ‘only’ within the territory of a sovereign State?”).
158. See Fenrick, supra note 139 (“As long as humanitarian law remains in two boxes
[IAC and NIAC], courts which address criminal responsibility in complex modern conflicts
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positivistic expression in Article 8 of the Rome Statute, indicating that this
expansive approach has been largely—although not entirely—ratified by the
community of States. 159 As a result, the International Criminal Court can
prosecute most—but not all—war crimes committed in any type of conflict,
as can States that have harmonized their domestic penal codes with the
Rome Statute. 160 For its part, the ICRC has identified in Rule 156 of its magisterial study of customary IHL a number of war crimes that States may prosecute, regardless of conflict classification. 161
Despite these developments in international law, U.S. prosecutors seeking to invoke the War Crimes Act are still required to undertake a conflict
classification exercise and to establish their conclusion by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt before they can levy charges against a suspected war criminal. This can embroil them in complex political determinations. For example, if crimes in Ukraine are under consideration, it would be necessary to
determine whether Russia is asserting sufficient control over separatists in
Ukraine to internationalize the conflict there. 162 Likewise when it comes to
the conflict in Yemen, which involves foreign support for both the internationally recognized government (e.g., Saudi Arabia et al.) and the Houthi rebels (e.g., Iran). 163 In light of the above, Congress could enhance the DOJ’s
ability to prosecute war crimes under Title 18 if it condensed the list of war
crimes to those unequivocally prosecutable across the conflict spectrum
without reference to their treaty provenance (which could alleviate the problems with the definition of “protected persons” as well). Such an approach
is entirely consistent with the constitutional power of Congress to “define

will be compelled to undergo similar analytical contortions” to those undergone by the
ICTY.).
159. See generally Hortensia D. T. Gutierrez Posse, The Relationship Between International
Humanitarian Law and the International Criminal Tribunals, 88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE
RED CROSS 65 (2006).
160. See Beth Van Schaack, Mapping War Crimes in Syria, 92 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 282 (2016) (discussing gaps in the Rome Statute’s war crimes regime, particularly as
applied to non-international armed conflicts).
161. Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Customary IHL Database, supra note 13, r. 156 (“Serious
violations of international humanitarian law constitute war crimes.”).
162. See Robert Heinsch, Conflict Classification in Ukraine: The Return of the “Proxy War”?,
91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 323 (2015).
163. See COMMISSION OF INTERNATIONAL JURISTS, BEARING THE BRUNT OF WAR IN
YEMEN: INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION 4–7 (July 2018).
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and punish” offenses against the law of nations. 164 Under the ideal formulation, all that would be required is a showing that the conduct had a nexus to
an armed conflict, however denominated. 165 Removing some of these more
technical attendant circumstances from the statute would not impact the
recognition of the social harm caused by the commission of war crimes—to
the victim, military order, and the international community writ large—or
the moral culpability of the offender. Prosecutors could thus focus on the
impugned conduct without having to prove definitively whether the conflict
at the time the defendant acted was an IAC or NIAC.
D. Extend the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility to Title 18
Turning to forms of criminal responsibility, individuals may be prosecuted
under U.S. federal law as principals and accomplices, 166 as accessories afterthe-fact, 167 and under theories of attempt; 168 when they commit crimes as
part of a conspiracy; 169 and when they order crimes to be committed. 170
However, there is no superior responsibility statute—in Title 18 or the
UCMJ for that matter—that expressly applies to war crimes or to the suite
of atrocity crimes more generally—an unfortunate accountability gap. 171 The
utility of the doctrine of superior responsibility is obvious: it allows prosecu164. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 10–11.
165. See generally Harmen van der Wilt, War Crimes and the Requirement of a Nexus with an
Armed Conflict, 10 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1113 (2012). See, e.g.,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES art. 8 (2013), https://www.icccpi.int/Publications/Elements-of-Crimes.pdf (requiring a showing that the conduct was
committed in “the context of and was associated with” an armed conflict).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 3.
168. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C § 1113 (criminalizing attempt to commit murder or manslaughter).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 371.
170. See Beth Van Schaack, Libya’s Haftar and Liability of Superiors: Ordering Offenses v.
Responsibility for Omissions, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/
45178/khalifa-haftar-liability-superiors-ordering-offenses-v-responsibility-omissions/.
171. See Beth Van Schaack, Title 18’s Blind Spot: Superior Responsibility, JUST SECURITY
(June 3, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/11066/title-18s-blindspot-superior-responsibility/. Corn & VanLandingham identify a similar gap in the UCMJ, so any superior responsibility statute should extend to civilian or military jurisdiction. Corn & VanLandingham,
supra note 4, at 356–63.
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tors to charge civilian or military leaders for crimes committed by their subordinates when such superiors knew, or should have known, that their subordinates were committing offenses and they failed to prevent or punish
them, thus vitiating the defense of willful blindness. 172 (To be sure, and depending on the facts, the superiors of those who commit international crimes
could be prosecuted under the forms of responsibility expressly legislated in
Title 18 (e.g., complicity), but defendants would no doubt challenge the legality of any charges based solely on a failure to prevent or punish the conduct of their subordinates.) Enacting a domestic superior responsibility statute would reflect IHL’s requirement that combatants be under responsible
command and better harmonize the U.S. legal framework addressed to atrocity crimes in light of the fact that superior responsibility exists in other areas
of U.S. law.
The doctrine of superior responsibility is well established in IHL (both
treaty and customary) and adjacent regimes. 173 The doctrine traces its origins
to the law of armed conflict and finds expression in a number of post-WWII
proceedings that involved the United States. In In re Yamashita, the U.S. Supreme Court entertained a habeas petition by a Japanese general convicted
by a U.S. military tribunal of atrocities committed by his subordinates. 174 The
Court found the general’s conviction lawful based on the doctrine of superior responsibility. Said the Court:
It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops whose excesses are unrestrained by the orders or efforts of their commander would
almost certainly result in violations which it is the purpose of the law of
war to prevent. Its purpose to protect civilian populations and prisoners of
war from brutality would largely be defeated if the commander of an invading army could with impunity neglect to take reasonable measures for
their protection. Hence the law of war presupposes that its violation is to
be avoided through the control of the operations of war by commanders
who are to some extent responsible for their subordinates. 175

172. See Beth Van Schaack, Command Responsibility: The Anatomy of Proof in Romagoza v.
Garcia, 36 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, LAW REVIEW 1213 (2003) (discussing elements of command responsibility under international law).
173. See generally Jamie Allan Williamson, Some Considerations on Command Responsibility and
Criminal Liability, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 303 (2008).
174. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1946).
175. Id. at 15.
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The decision, however, has been widely criticized for establishing what
amounted to strict liability that did not require a showing of any mens rea or
any ability to exercise effective control over subordinates engaged in
abuses. 176
Following World War II, a number of other U.S. military tribunals invoked the doctrine of superior responsibility to prosecute mid-level Nazi
defendants who were not indicted by the Nuremberg Tribunal. 177 In the Hostage Case (United States v. List et al.), for example, a U.S. military tribunal held
that “a corps commander must be held responsible for the acts of his subordinate commanders in carrying out his orders and for acts which the corps
commander knew or ought to have known about.” 178 The tribunal went on
to explain that:
[w]ant of knowledge of the contents of reports made to him is not a defense. Reports to commanding generals are made for their special benefit.
Any failure to acquaint themselves with the contents of such reports or a
failure to require additional reports where inadequacy appears on their face,
constitutes a dereliction of duty which he cannot use on his own behalf. 179

In the High Command Case (United States v. von Leeb et al.), another U.S. military
tribunal observed that for a superior to be held criminally liable for the acts
of his subordinates, “[t]here must be a personal dereliction. That can occur
only where the act is directly traceable to him or where his failure to properly
supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal negligence on his part.” 180
In terms of treaty law, superior responsibility finds expression in Articles
86–87 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions:

176. Jenny Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command Responsibility: From Yamashita
to Blaškić and Beyond, 5 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 638 (2007). For a
more modern articulation of the doctrine by a U.S. court invoking international criminal law
jurisprudence, see Ford ex. rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1286, 1288–89
(11th Cir. 2002).
177. See Brian Finucane, A Commander’s Duty to Punish War Crimes: Past U.S. Recognition,
JUST SECURITY (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/72915/a-commanders-dutyto-punish-war-crimes-past-u-s-recognition/ (compiling cases focused, in particular, on the
commander’s duty to punish).
178. United States v. List et al. (The Hostage Case), VIII LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS 34, 89 (1949).
179. Id. at 71.
180. United States v. von Leeb et al. (The High Command Case), XII LAW REPORTS
OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 76 (1949).
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Article 86(2): The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol
was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal
or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he [a subordinate] was committing or was going to
commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within
their power to prevent or repress the breach.
Article 87(3): The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall
require any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons
under his control are going to commit or have committed a breach of the
Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to
prevent such violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, and, where
appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators
thereof. 181

Modern treaties are in accord. 182
The United States was instrumental in drafting the ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda statutes as a permanent member of the
U.N. Security Council. Article 7(3) of the Statute for the ICTY states:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present
Statute [war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity] was committed
by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if
he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit
such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof. 183

181. Protocol I, supra note 2. The United States has not taken issue with the treaty’s
formulation of superior responsibility. See Dupuis et al., supra note 149 (reproducing the
remarks of Michael Matheson). Indeed, the original Army Field Manual & Regulations and
subsequent U.S. military manuals have all incorporated a parallel formulation of superior
responsibility. See FM 27-10, supra note 33, ¶ 501; OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 18.23.3.2 (rev. ed. 2016).
182. See, e.g., International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance art. 6, Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3 (2006).
183. See, e.g., Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
art. 7(3), S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993) (adopting the proposed statute contained within the
Secretary-General’s Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808).
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This provision has been interpreted and applied in a range of cases involving
military and civilian superiors. 184 Likewise, Article 28 of the Rome Statute
embodies the doctrine, but imposes a slightly different test for military and
non-military superiors. 185
According to the ICRC, customary international law allows superiors to
be prosecuted under the doctrine of superior responsibility across the conflict classification spectrum. 186 Indeed, many key U.S. allies have incorporated the doctrine of superior responsibility into their penal codes or military
manuals. 187 By way of example, the U.K. Law of Armed Conflict Manual
(2004) provides:
Military commanders are responsible for preventing violations of the law
(including the law of armed conflict) and for taking the necessary disciplinary action. A commander will be criminally responsible if he participates
in the commission of a war crime himself . . . , particularly if he orders its
commission. However, he also becomes criminally responsible if he “knew
or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known” that war
crimes were being or were about to be committed and failed “to take all
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or
repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authority for investigation and prosecution.” 188

184. Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A,
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 16, 2001).
185. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 28.
186. Rule 153 of the ICRC’s customary international law study states:
Commanders and other superiors are criminally responsible for war crimes committed by
their subordinates if they knew, or had reason to know, that the subordinates were about
to commit or were committing such crimes and did not take all necessary and reasonable
measures in their power to prevent their commission, or if such crimes had been committed,
to punish the persons responsible.

Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Customary IHL Database, supra note 13.
187. The ICRC has collected HCP formulations of the doctrine as well as State practice.
See Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Practice Relating to Rule 153: Command Responsibility for Failure to
Prevent, Punish or Report War Crimes, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/
v2_rul_rule153 (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
188. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, JSP 383, § 16.36 (2004), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attacment_data/file/27874/JSP38320
04Edition.pdf (citations removed) (citing the Rome Statute and Protocol I).
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The clearest articulation of the doctrine in U.S. law appears in the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which governs the prosecution before military commission of certain enemy combatants, including those superiors
whose subordinates commit offenses. It provides that:
Any person punishable under this chapter who . . . is a superior commander
who, with regard to acts punishable by this chapter, knew, had reason to
know, or should have known, that a subordinate was about to commit such
acts or had done so and who failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof, is a
principal. 189

The U.S. Department of Defense’s instructions for military commissions
provides that a “person is criminally liable as a principal for a completed
substantive offense if that person commits the offense (perpetrator), aids or
abets the commission of the offense, solicits commission of the offense, or
is otherwise responsible due to command responsibility.” 190 It goes on to
identify the following elements of the doctrine:
1. The accused had command and control, or effective authority and control, over one or more subordinates;
2. One or more of the accused’s subordinates committed, attempted to
commit, conspired to commit, solicited to commit, or aided or abetted the
commission of one or more substantive offenses triable by military commission;
3. The accused either knew or should have known that the subordinate or
subordinates were committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, soliciting, or aiding or abetting such offense or offenses; and
4. The accused failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
his power to prevent or repress the commission of the offense or offenses. 191

The federal courts have also adjudicated superior responsibility cases in
the context of suits under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim
189. 10 U.S.C. § 950q (2006).
190. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 2, Crimes and
Elements for Trials by Military Commission ¶ 6(C) (Apr. 30, 2003).
191. Id. ¶ 6(C)(3)(a).
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Protection Act. 192 This includes caselaw in the Fourth, 193 Sixth, 194 Ninth, 195
and Eleventh Circuits, 196 as well as several district courts. 197 Likewise, under
immigration law, alien superiors can be excluded or removed from the
United States if they fail to prevent or punish crimes committed by their
subordinates. 198 For example, in In re D-R-, the Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that a police officer of the Republic of Srpska was subject to
removal because as a commander, “he knew, or, in light of the circumstances
at the time, should have known, that subordinates had committed, were
committing, or were about to commit unlawful acts,” including extrajudicial
killings. 199
Including superior responsibility as a punishable form of responsibility
within Title 18 would extend the reach of U.S. law to individuals who may
not commit atrocities themselves but instead allow their subordinates to do

192. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73. The legislative history of the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA) makes plain that Congress contemplated superior responsibility liability for acts of
torture and extrajudicial killing. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8–9 (1991). See generally Brief of Amici
Curiae Retired U.S. Military Commanders and Law of War Scholars in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants and Reversal, Mamani v. Bustamante, 968 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2020).
193. Warfaa v. Ali, 33 F.Supp. 3d 653, 666 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, 811 F.3d 653 (4th Cir.
2014) (finding sufficient facts alleged to support command responsibility under the TVPA
where plaintiff alleged defendant was aware that subordinates had abducted and tortured
plaintiff).
194. Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 499 (6th Cir. 2009).
195. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 777 (9th Cir. 1996).
196. Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (“There is extensive support from international law and in the text, legislative history, and jurisprudence of
the TVPA for civilian liability under the command responsibility doctrine.”).
197. See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 172, 173 n.4 (D. Mass. 1995); Doe
v. Qi, 349 F.Supp. 2d 1258, 1332–33 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Yousuf v. Samantar, No.
1:04cv1360, 2012 WL 3730617, 10–11, 13 (E.D. Va. 2012) (walking through the elements
of command responsibility and finding them satisfied).
198. Section 212(a)(3)(E) of the Immigration & Nationality Act renders inadmissible
any alien “who, outside the United States, has committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in” an act of torture or any extrajudicial killing, a formulation that has
been interpreted to include superior responsibility. See Presidential Proclamation 8697—
Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons Who Participate in Serious Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Violations and Other Abuses (Aug. 4, 2011)
(suspending entry to “[a]ny alien who planned, ordered, assisted, aided and abetted, committed or otherwise participated in, including through command responsibility, widespread
or systematic violence against any civilian population”).
199. In re D-R-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 445 (B.I.A. Apr. 6, 2011).
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so with impunity. 200 It would ensure that the United States can prosecute
superiors in its midst—and not just the rank-and-file—particularly given that
superiors are more likely to have the financial and other means to travel to
the United States.
Because the doctrine of superior responsibility already finds expression
in other areas of U.S. law, devising an appropriate standard for war crimes,
which could also apply to the punitive provisions of the UCMJ and other
atrocity crimes within Title 18, should be straightforward. For example, chapeau language in § 2441(a) could be amended to read: “It shall be unlawful
for any person to commit, order, aid or abet, or otherwise participate, including through superior responsibility, in any of the following acts, . . .”
Later, at § 2441(c), the statute could define superior responsibility with reference to § 950q of the Military Commissions Act. Ideally, the Military Commissions Act definition could be incorporated by reference to apply to all
other international crimes legislation and the UCMJ as well. This would better rationalize the U.S. legal framework addressing atrocity crimes and ensure
that all superiors, including U.S. personnel, are held to the same standards as
enemy combatants.
E. Recriminalize Outrages Upon Personal Dignity
Finally, Congress should consider reinstating all violations of Common Article 3 as war crimes under the War Crimes Act. Of particular relevance is
the crime of committing “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment,” which covers conduct that might not
rise to the level of torture but that is nonetheless prohibited by humanitarian
law. This charge has proven to be quite useful in Europe, 201 where prosecutorial authorities have charged perpetrators fleeing the overlapping wars in
200. Human rights treaty bodies have noted this deficiency in U.S. law and called for
its rectification. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth
Periodic Report of the United States of America ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4
(Apr. 23, 2014).
201. See generally Anna Andersson, Outrage Upon the Personal Dignity of the Dead in International and Swedish War Crimes Legislation and Case Law, in 66 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW:
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION IN SCANDINAVIA OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 245
(Lydia Lundstedt ed., 2020) (discussing the origins, elements, and utility of this charge).
Courts have ruled that the dead are “protected persons” within international armed conflicts
per the Geneva Conventions, although this conclusion is not without its detractors. See Kai
Ambos, Deceased Persons as Protected Persons within the Meaning of International Humanitarian Law,
16 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1105 (2018).
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Syria and Iraq with this crime based upon trophy videos showing them disrespecting someone hors de combat, a seriously wounded person, or a corpse. 202
In many of these cases, it is not possible to prove that the defendant killed
or wounded the individual victim depicted, but producing and/or disseminating the photo itself on social media or elsewhere is res ipsa loquitur when it
comes to outrages upon dignity. Re-criminalizing common Article 3’s due
process violations is also desirable, but may be a bridge too far while the
military commissions are still operating at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Station.
V.

CONCLUSION

These legislative and interpretive fixes are not dramatic; nor should they be
particularly controversial as they track existing law and reflect U.S. treaty obligations that have been recognized by the most pertinent U.S. agencies. Together, they will help actuate the woefully under-utilized prosecutorial authorities Congress has enacted. Furthermore, they would enable the United
States to live up to its sovereign obligations to ensure accountability for
breaches of IHL; strengthen an important tool in its prosecutorial arsenal
that has yet to be utilized, notwithstanding the presence of potential war
criminals in U.S. territory and clear congressional interest in IHL enforcement; and bolster the United States’ ability to mount complementarity arguments vis-à-vis extraterritorial or international prosecutions of its personnel.
The United States should continue to refine and rationalize its ability to prosecute international crimes by closing existing accountability deficits resulting
in states of impunity; signal its firm commitment to the values underlying
IHL; and contribute to the interpretation and enforcement of IHL—thus
strengthening its retributive, deterrent, and expressive components—by
holding those accountable who would commit the worst crimes known to
humankind.

202. In these latter cases, the courts have relied, in part, on the Rome Statute’s Elements
of Crimes, which confirm that “persons” includes dead persons. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES art. 8(2)(b)(xxi), War Crime of Outrages upon Personal
Dignity, n.49 (2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Publications/Elements-of-Crimes.pdf.
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